NAGORSKI: What do the Balkans need?
SOROS: I’m endorsing the key ideas in the plan developed by the Center for European Policy Studies, a Brussels think tank. It has four elements. One is that the EU takes control of the customs service of the countries of Southeastern Europe. Second, [the EU] would pay compensation to the governments for the loss of customs revenues. Third, there’d be a subsidy element in this because [the payments] would be based on normal rather than war-ravaged conditions; it’s a pump-priming mechanism. But this subsidy element would depend on [governments’] meeting certain political conditions. The fourth element would be the introduction of a common currency–the euro or, until the euro is in existence, the Deutsche mark.
What would all this produce?
A free-trade area. But as soon as the EU is satisfied that the borders are properly supervised, the area would then become part of the European Common Market, allowing for free trade for industrial goods. The extent to which agricultural products, which are the mainstay of this region, would be admitted to the EU would be a matter of negotiation; the EU has big problems with agricultural products. But the EU would have to make some concessions in order to allow the region to recover. The countries of the region would also be candidates for admission to the EU, but that would be way down the road.
Customs are not only a source of official revenues but of massive corruption. Why should governments give this up?
The corruption is obviously built into the state, so this would undermine the regimes. People in the region would much prefer to be in Europe than where they are. They will be for anything that brings them closer to Europe. The overall benefits of the scheme will be so large that the vested interests won’t be able to resist it. If any particular government wants to stay out, it can. But I don’t think it’ll be able to withstand the popular pressure. I think this scheme would get rid of Milosevic.
How?
Yugoslavia would be invited to participate in the customs union, but it would not get the subsidies, the major assistance, until it agrees to hold elections under the auspices of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe]. The attraction of this scheme will force its acceptance. This offers a way to remove Milosevic from power and to prepare the country for genuine elections.
Will Milosevic be tried by the War Crimes Tribunal?
Unless he commits suicide. Public opinion can turn around in Yugoslavia. When Yugoslavia is no longer threatened and no longer bombed, when people look at the devastation and become aware of all the crimes of the regime and all the lies they were told, they can turn against him. The Serbian Orthodox Church has turned against him already. Opinion is very volatile, and he could be turned on as the man who brought shame on the Serb nation.
The prospect of money would bring about more political change than bombing did?
You can change the regime by offering a more attractive alternative rather than by threatening national survival. A threat to national survival makes people close ranks, whereas the prospect of a better future opens people up.
How much will all this cost?
The estimate for the direct subsidies is 5 billion euros a year. There’s room for that in the EU budget. There will be a lot of other costs–technical assistance, credit facilities, World Bank programs. All those should be done on a commercial basis. Our efforts to rebuild Bosnia have basically failed because the area is too small and all aid had to go through the government. Here, it’ll be private enterprise that drives the process.
Why are you so involved in this region?
I became involved through my commitment to the idea of an open society. The conflict in this region can be understood as one between a tribal concept–my people, right or wrong–and the universal concept of right and wrong, which applies to all people equally. My foundations sought to support the universal concept, the civic concept of citizenship instead of the ethnic concept. For each nationality to have its own state is neither practical nor acceptable.
